We provide a tight bound on the amount of experimentation under the optimal strategy in sequential decision problems. We show the applicability of the result by providing a bound on the cut-off in a one-arm bandit problem.
Introduction
A basic issue faced by the statistician in sequential decision problems is the trade-off between the cost of pursuing the experimentation and the informational benefit from doing so. For instance, in bandit problems, the decision maker chooses whether to pull an apparently optimal arm, or to pull some seemingly poorer one, in the hope of thereby getting valuable information.
Such problems lead to unwieldy analytical problems, rarely amenable to closedform solutions, which is arguably one reason why sequential methods are still seldom relied upon in practice (see Lai (2001) , Armitage (1975) ). For bandit problems, while the optimal strategy is well characterized and consists in pulling the arm with highest dynamic allocation index (Gittins and Jones (1974) , Gittins (1979) ), the explicit computation of these indices is rarely feasible, except for very specific cases where the risky arm yields a Bernoulli payoff (see for instance Bradt, Johnson and Karlin (1956) , Feldman (1962) , Woodroofe (1979) , Berry and Fristedt (1985) ).
Over the years, a number of approaches have been pursued: (i) computing approximate solutions of the corresponding dynamic programming equation, as in Berry (1972) or Fabius and van Zwet (1970) ; (ii) relying on close-by problems for which explicit solutions are known, as in Lai (1987) ; (iii) using extensively numerical computations, as in Lai (1988, for sequential testing of composite hypotheses); (iv) designing ad hoc policies, sometimes investigating their performance numerically, as in Cornfield, Halperin and Greenhouse (1969), Berry and Sobel (1973) , Berry (1978) and, more recently, (v) finding explicit a priori bounds, as in Brezzi and Lai (2000) .
This note contributes to the last category. Motivated by economic applications, (see, e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) , Bolton and Harris (1999) , Bergemann and Välimäki (2000) , Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) , Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille (2007)), we consider general Bayesian, discounted sequential problems. The parameter θ has an initial distribution P (the belief of the economic agent). The agent repeatedly receives some information, chooses an action from a set A, and get a possibly unobserved instantaneous reward u(θ, a). Future gains are discounted by a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). Given a decision rule σ, and a stage n, we define the amount of experimentation in stage n to be the difference ∆ n between the currently highest reward, and the current reward obtained when using σ.
We show that, for every optimal decision rule, the expected value of +∞ n=1 ∆ n does not exceed Cδ/(1 − δ), where C is a bound 1 on the reward function u. The bound is valid irrespective of the prior belief P, and no matter how information flows in to the decision maker. This result was used in Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille (2009) to show that the limit payoff of neighbors in connected social networks coincides, and to provide conditions that ensure concensus. We next show, by means of an example, that this bound is tight. We also illustrate how to use this bound in practice to derive a priori estimates for specific sequential problems. For simplicity, we focus on an instance of a one-arm bandit problem, for which no explicit solution is available, and give an estimate of the optimal boundary in the associated optimal stopping problem. In contrast to Brezzi and Lai (2000) , who provide a bound on the Gittins' index in bandit problems, our bound is on the cut-off of the optimal strategy.
Setup and Results
The parameter set 2 is a measurable space (Θ, A), endowed with a prior distribution P. At each stage n ≥ 1, a decision maker first gets an observation drawn from a (measurable) set S, then chooses an action a out of a (compact metric) set A, and gets a reward u(θ, a). The decision maker discounts future rewards at the rate δ ∈ [0, 1). The reward function u : Ω×A → R is (jointly) measurable, and continuous w.r.t. a. In addition, we assume that the highest reward u : θ → max a∈A u(θ, a) and the lowest reward u : θ → min a∈A u(θ, a) have finite expectation. We stress that we place no restriction whatsoever on the nature of observations: 3 e.g., they may depend, possibly in a random way, on the parameter θ, and on past observations and actions; they may or may not reveal past rewards; and they may be independent or not.
1 In particular, ∆ n < ∞ a.s., hence any optimal decision rule eventually stops to experiment. 2 In spite of the qualifier "parameter", our decision problems are non-parametric, since the space Θ is fully general.
3 Beyond the minimal, technical assumption that the observation in stage n is drawn according to a transition probability from Θ × (S × A) n−1 to S.
Note that we assume that the current reward is a deterministic function u(ω, a) of the parameter ω and of the action a. This assumption is made without loss of generality. Statistical models such as multi-armed bandit problems, where the decision maker observes her current reward that randomly depends on θ (and on a), can be cast into the above framework. Indeed, it suffices to re-label such a random reward as the "observation", and to define the reward to be the expectation of the "observation". Such a change does not affect the optimal decision rules, nor the optimal value of the problem.
For a decision 4 rule σ, P σ is the joint distribution of θ and of the infinite sequence of observations and decisions. Expectation w.r.t. P σ is denoted by E σ . We focus on the amount of experimentation that optimal decisions entail. To be specific, let a decision rule σ be given. Given a stage n, we denote by H n the information available at stage n, that is, the σ-field induced by past observations and actions. When using the decision rule σ prior to stage n, the expectation E σ [u(θ, a)|H n ] is the expected reward when choosing a in stage n, given all available information, and u n := max a∈A E σ [u(θ, a)|H n ] is the myopically optimal reward. Thus, letting a n denote the action of the decision maker in stage n, u n = E σ [u(θ, a n )|H n ] is the actual reward that the decision maker expects to get in stage n, when following σ. The difference ∆ n := u n − u n provides a measure of the degree of experimentation performed in stage n. The infinite sum n≥1 ∆ n therefore measures the overall amount of experimentation.
Theorem 2.1 For any optimal decision rule σ, one has
.
Beyond quantitative implications, this bound also yields qualitative implications. Consider for instance a multi-arm bandit problem. For simplicity, assume that the types of the various arms are first drawn, and that each arm then yields a sequence of rewards, which is conditionally i.i.d. given its type. For concreteness, assume that with probability 1 over the types, the expected outputs of the arms are all distinct.
Observe that, whenever the decision maker pulls a specific arm infinitely often, she eventually learns the type of this arm. Therefore, whenever the decision maker pulls two specific arms infinitely often, she eventually learns both types. Since one of these two arms is "better" than the other, this implies that the sequence (∆ n ) n≥1 then does not converge to zero. By Footnote 1, this event must have probability 0, for every optimal decision rule. In other words: any optimal allocation rule samples finitely often all arms but one. This provides an alternative proof of Theorem 2 in Brezzi and Lai (2000). 5 We next show that the bound in Theorem 2.1 is tight. Proposition 2.2 For every ε and for every discount factor δ, there is a decision problem with an optimal decision rule σ such that
The decision problem in Proposition 2.2 depends both on ε and on δ. The next proposition improves in this respect, at a slight cost in the speed of convergence. In this statement, and given ε > 0, we denote by N(ε) the (random) number of stages in which ∆ n is at least ε: N(ε) := |{n ≥ 1 : ∆ n ≥ ε}|. Plainly, n≥1 ∆ n ≥ εN(ε) for every ε > 0.
Proposition 2.3
There is a decision problem such that for every δ > 2/3 there is a unique optimal decision rule σ that satisfies
That is, as ε decreases, the expected number E σ [N(ε)] of experimentation stages increases faster than 1/ε α , for every α < 1.
Proofs

Proof of Theorem 2.1
Consider an optimal decision rule σ. Set Y n := (1 − δ)
Y n can be interpreted as the continuation reward under the optimal decision rule (discounted back to stage n).
Since one option available to the decision maker, from stage n on, is to ignore all future observations, and to keep choosing the action that was myopically optimal in stage n, we have
Now, rewrite Y n as
From (1) and (2) we obtain:
so that after cancelling u n from both sides and dividing by δ,
Substituting (3) into (2), we obtain
Taking expectations, summing over n = 1, . . . , k, using
, and taking the limit as k goes to infinity, we obtain
as desired.
Proof of Proposition 2.2
Fix δ > 0. Note that if the statement holds for ε 0 , then it holds for every ε > ε 0 . We will prove that the statement holds for ε = 1/m, for any natural number m > 1/δ. Let Θ = {θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ m } and A = {a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a m } contain m and m + 1 elements respectively. The prior belief on Θ is uniform, and the reward function is given by :
Thus, once the parameter is inferred with certainty, there is a unique optimal action, whereas ex ante, a 1 , . . . , a m are all myopically optimal, while a 0 is (1/m)-suboptimal. Information is provided to the decision maker according to the following rules: if the decision maker has chosen a 0 in all previous stages, the true parameter is revealed with probability c := we obtain that the expected reward is 1/m, so that this strategy is optimal. However, for ε = 1/m one has:
Sinceū = 1 and u = 0 we get the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 2.3
We provide an example within the class of Gaussian models. Set Θ = R, and let the action set A = R ∪ {−∞, +∞} be the set of extended real numbers, endowed with the usual topology. The reward function u(θ, a) is equal to one if a ∈ R and |θ − a| ≤ 1, and equal to zero otherwise.
Given a normal distribution µ with precision ρ (that is, with variance 1/ρ), definē u(ρ) to be the highest reward that the decision maker may achieve, when holding the belief µ. Observe thatū(ρ) does not depend on the mean of µ. Plainly, the map ρ →ū(ρ) is continuous and increasing, with lim ρ→0ū (ρ) = 0, and lim ρ→+∞ū (ρ) = 1.
The signalling structure of the decision problem is designed in such a way that the decision maker's belief is always a normal distribution. In addition, she keeps receiving additional information about θ as long as she follows a pre-specified sequence of suboptimal actions.
To be specific, let (ε n ) n≥1 be a decreasing sequence of positive numbers that satisfies (i) ∞ n=1 ε n ∈ (1/2, 1), (ii) ε n n β → +∞, for every β > 1, and 6 (iii)
. The sequence (ρ n ) n≥1 is defined recursively by the condition
Let the prior distribution P be a normal distribution with precision ρ 1 , and let (ξ n ) n≥2 be a sequence of independent normally distributed variables with precision ρ n , and independent from θ.
Observe that, in the absence of any information about θ, the decision maker's myopically optimal reward isū(ρ 1 ) = ε 1 . We set a 1 = +∞. On the other hand, if she receives the observations s k := θ + ξ k , k = 2, · · · , n (n ≥ 2), her belief over θ is normally distributed, with precision ρ 1 + · · · + ρ n . Hence, her myopically optimal reward isū(ρ 1 + · · · + ρ n ) = ε 1 + · · · + ε n , and there is an action a n (which depends on s 2 , . . . , s n ), which yields an expected reward equal to ε 1 + · · · , +ε n−1 .
We now define the information received by the decision maker:
• Prior to stage 1, the decision maker receives no observation;
• Prior to stage 2, she receives the observation s 2 = θ + ξ 2 if she played a 1 = +∞ at the first stage, and no observation otherwise;
• Prior to stage n > 2, she receives the observation s n = θ + ξ n if she played a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n−1 at the previous stages. Otherwise, she receives no observation.
6 For instance, choose ε n = (n ln 2 n)
Playing the sequence (a n ) of actions is the unique optimal decision rule. Indeed, if the decision maker first deviates from that sequence at stage k ≥ 1, she receives no further information, hence her optimal reward in all later stages is ε 1 + · · · + ε k ; if she sticks to the sequence (a n ), her continuation reward (discounted back to stage k) is
By (iii), this reward is higher than ε 1 + · · · + ε k . Note that a n is (myopically) ε n -optimal, for each n ≥ 1. Since the sequence (ε n ) is decreasing, there are exactly n rounds in which the decision maker does not play a myopically ε n -optimal action, so that by (ii) (ε n ) α N(ε n ) = n(ε n ) α converges to infinity for every α < 1.
Application
We here illustrate how Theorem 2.1 can be used to derive a priori bounds on the optimal decision rules in specific decision problems. Since our goal is here purely illustrative, we restrict ourselves to the analysis of a specific one-arm bandit problem, where the risky arm has two possible types, a good type and a bad type, and observations are i.i.d. In such a problem, the optimal decision rule consists of pulling the risky arm as long as the posterior probability assigned to the good type exceeds a specific cut-off, and then in switching permanently to the safe arm. We set the problem so as to depart as little as possible from a Bernoulli problem, for which a closed form expression for the optimal cut-off is known. We also make no attempt at optimizing our final bound.
The type θ of the risky arm takes values in the two-point set {θ 0 , θ 1 }. Both types are ex ante equally likely. The safe arm yields zero. Given θ = θ i , the risky arm may yield three different rewards, a, b and c, with probabilities p Denote by π n the posterior belief that θ = θ 1 , based on all observations prior to stage n, and let Z n = ln π n 1 − π n be the log-likelihood ratio. Conditional on θ = θ 0 , the sequence (Z n ) follows a random walk, which moves up by α (with probability p 0 a ), by 2α, or moves down by α between any two stages.
The optimal decision rule consists in pulling the risky arm until the first stage σ * where Z n = −k * α, for some k * ∈ N, and then in pulling repeatedly the safe arm. We will derive an upper bound on k * using Theorem 2.1.
The amount of experimentation in stage n is ∆ n = max{0, 1/2 − π n }. For k < k * , let N(k) be the number of passage of the sequence (Z n ) at the level −kα, and denote by ε(k) = 1/2 − e −kα
1 + e −kα the corresponding value of ∆ n . Thus,
Observe now that whenever Z n = −kα, the expected number of visits (including stage n) to −kα before Z n moves below −kα is 1/(1 − p 0 a ). On the other hand, it is then the case that the sequence (Z n ) moves down to −(k+1)α. Hence, the probability that (Z n ) will move back to −kα before hitting −k * α is 7 at least p 0 a . Therefore,
By Theorem 2.1 one has 1 2
. Therefore, (7) and (8) 
By monotonicity, the left-hand side of (9) is at least equal to .
